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Abstract
On the study of cooperation behavior, agent-based 
simulation possesses the advantage of being capable to 
build a more detailed model and perform more elaborated 
analysis. Macroscopic characteristics of the system can 
be revealed by the combined behaviors of microscopic 
units in the system using an agent-based simulation 
model. Based on previous works, this paper proposes a 
cooperation behavior simulation model using NetLogo 
software. A third-party supervisor who re-allocates 
resources among participants in the system is added to 
the simulation model. Results show that adding the re-
allocator in the system expands the survival space for 
cooperators and increases system robustness. 
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INTRODUCTION
Cooperation is referred to a close, long-term, mutually 
beneficial agreement between two or more partners in 
which resources, knowledge, and capabilities are shared 
with the objective of enhancing the competitive position 
of each partner (Spekman Forbes, 1998). The research 
pattern on cooperation behavior can be mainly divided 
into three types (Huimin, 2003): a) General theoretical 
analysis, including cooperation modeling features, 
cooperation stability and cooperation information study. 
b) Computer simulation, such as the work of (Axelrod 
& Hamilton, 1999), which proposed a cooperation 
evolution theory based on Game Theory through studying 
simulated cooperation. This is the mainstream research 
framework in this field at present. This paper belongs to 
this research field of cooperation evolution. c) Empirical 
analysis. Compared to other research tools, models built 
by computer simulation can reveal the time-variant 
features and the evolution process of the system. On the 
other hand, computer simulation such as ABM (Agent-
based Modeling) is capable of looking into the behaviors 
of microscopic individuals in a system. Macroscopic 
characteristics of the system can then be outlined based on 
the combination of such microscopic behaviors.
ABM is broadly applied in the academic research of 
cooperation behavior and is often used to analyze the 
influence of a system’s factors on individual behavior 
and overall system performance. Choi (2008) analyzed 
the influence of knowledge learning pattern and group 
structure on cooperation behavior. It was stated that 
global learning and local interaction provide the most 
favorable environment for the evolution of cooperation. 
However, the defect of this pattern lies in the free rides of 
defectors in global learning process. Sheikh (2009) builts 
a computer simulation model based on the prisoner’s 
dilemma in his study and considered factors of repeated 
game and local interaction (Von Neuman neighborhood). 
The analysis shows that reciprocal-strategy players and 
learning delay are beneficial cooperation. Similarly, Bo 
and Chen (2010) studied the relationship between social 
welfare preference and cooperation frequency. The author 
added agents of social welfare preference in the model as 
an extension of the Barabási and Albert networks based on 
the prisoners’ dilemma. Results show that social welfare 
preference is favorable to cooperation in many cases. But 
neighborhood size and initial cooperation level are also 
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important factors for the determination of cooperation 
frequency. In the study of (Di & Yan, 2011), the influence 
of different environmental factors (survival difficulty, 
reproduction cost) on the population of cooperators and 
non-cooperators was analyzed. It was stated by the author 
that the combination of high survival difficulty and high 
reproduction cost promotes the population of cooperators. 
To conclude the researches in the field of cooperation 
behavior simulation study, the influences of different 
environmental factors and attributes of players on 
cooperation behaviors in a system are most frequently 
discussed. However, parties in the system are usually 
restricted to two opposite ones: cooperator and non-
cooperator. In the real world social system, there are 
supervising and punishing mechanisms for purely 
individual-benefited, public-harmful behaviors. There 
are also rewarding and stimulating mechanisms for 
behaviors promoting overall social welfare. Given that 
fact, this paper extends the model of (Di & Yan, 2011) and 
adds to supervisors in the system as restriction for non-
cooperators and reward for cooperators. The extended 
model is more close to the real world social system 
structure and capable of delivering more realistic outputs 
for analysis. 
1 .  B R I E F  I N T R O D U C T I O N  O F 
COOPERATION BEHAVIOR NETLOGO 
SIMULATION MODEL
NetLogo was proposed by Uri Wilensky in 1999, and 
was then continuously developed by the “Correlation 
Study Center” of Northwestern University in America. 
NetLogo is a programmable modeling platform based on 
Java language and is capable of simulating natural and 
social phenomena. A simulation model built by NetLogo 
is a two-dimensional world consisted of turtle, patch and 
observer. Patch is the static background composing the 
grids. Turtles move on the grids while observer observes 
the events happened in this “world” as one of the agents. 
Turtle is a general name for players in different outlooks 
in different models. Outlooks of patch include grasslands 
and roads, etc. (Di & Yan, 2011).
In this paper, turtle is divided into three types: 
cooperative turtles, non-cooperative turtles and supervisor. 
Patch is represented by grass. Standing on green patches 
(grass), red cows and blue cows represent cooperative 
players and non-cooperative players respectively. Besides, 
as a third party of turtle, supervisors are displayed in 
men’s shape. A supervisor practices functions are similar 
to government and court, judging if a cooperator (or non-
cooperator) has any historical behaviors of protecting (or 
raiding) resources and rewarding (or punishing) it based 
on its history. 
Turtles and grass possess energy. When energy level 
is down to zero, except for supervisor, turtles and grass 
die. Growth rate of grass on each patch is determined by 
grass height and growth threshold. When the grass height 
is lower than the growth threshold, the grass is less likely 
to grow. When the grass height is higher than or equal to 
growth threshold, it is more likely to grow. Cooperators 
and non-cooperators share grass as their only limited 
resource (source of energy) to achieve the same goal of 
reproduction. Gaining more resources means closer to the 
requirements of reproduction. Each grass possesses certain 
units of energy. Each turtle (except supervisor) consumes 
the grass where it stands. Consequently, the grass loses 
one unit of energy and the turtle gains a certain amount of 
energy. 
When a non-cooperator stands on a patch, whether the 
grass is within growth threshold or not, it consumes the 
grass. When a cooperator stands on a patch, if the grass 
is lower than growth threshold, it does not consume the 
grass. Only when the grass height is more than the growth 
threshold will a cooperator consumes the grass. To be 
brief, cooperators save more resources for the crowd at 
the costs of individual welfare while non-cooperators 
make decisions based only on individual interests, 
regardless of overall welfare. In order to simplify the 
matter, we assume that cooperators play cooperatively 
while non-cooperators play non-cooperatively all the time. 
Supervisors roam around the world and do not reproduce. 
When a supervisor encounters another non-supervisor-
turtle, it judges its type and related historical cooperative 
or non-cooperative behavior. If it is a cooperator that 
the supervisor encounters and the cooperator has any 
historical behaviors of reserving grass lower than growth 
threshold, the supervisor rewards it with energy. If it 
is a non-cooperator with resource-raiding history, the 
supervisor punishes it with depriving certain amounts of 
its energy. A non-negative global variable “energy pool” 
is defined in this model to store the energy deprived 
from non-cooperators and pay the energy as rewards to 
cooperators. If the “energy pool” is down to zero, rewards 
cannot be done. The process of paying for cooperators 
with energy deprived from non-cooperators acts as a 
resource re-allocation performed by the supervisors.
2. PARAMETERS OF COOPERATION 
BEHAVIOR NETLOGO SIMULATION 
MODEL
Dependent Variable 1: Population of cooperator; 
Dependent Variable 2: Population of non-cooperator;
(Dependent Variable 1 and 2 share the same initial 
value. The sum of them is set default to 20.)
Independent Variable 1: Stride-length. Stride-length 
determines the distance each non-supervisor-turtle covers 
each turn. When stride-length increases, general mobility 
goes up. In this paper, stride-length is within a range of [0, 
0.30]. Initial value is set to 0.08.
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Independent Variable 2: Resource-competence. 
Resource-competence is the behavioral benefits for non-
supervisor-turtles. Assuming resource-competence is X, 
when a non-supervisor-turtle gains one unit of energy 
from the grass, its energy increases X units. Range of 
resource-competence is [0, 200] with an initial value of 
51.
Independent Variable 3: Metabolism. Metabolism is 
the behavioral cost. Mobility helps individuals gaining 
resources at the cost of a certain amount of energy. 
Initial value is set to 6 with a range of [0, 99] while 
initial energy of each non-supervisor-turtle is set as, 
which means without resources gaining, the maximum 
distance each initial non-supervisor-turtle can cover is 
? ?
??????????
?????? ? ??????
  .
Independent  Var iable  4 :  Reproduct ion  cos t . 
Reproduction cost is the amount of energy lost every time 
a turtle reproduction. Its range is [0, 99] with an initial 
value of 54.
Control Variable 1: Reproduction threshold. When a 
turtle achieves an energy level of reproduction threshold, 
it performs reproduction. A new turtle of its type is 
created. The old one loses an amount of energy of the 
reproduction threshold. Reproduction threshold is within 
a range of [0, 200] with an initial value of 102.
Control Variable 2: Growth threshold. Growth 
threshold is within a range of [0, 99] with an initial value 
of 9. When a grass’s height is higher than or equal to 
growth threshold, the probability of growth is based on 
“high-growth-probability”. Reversely, the probability is 
based on “low-growth-probability”. Both of “high-growth-
probability” and “low-growth-probability” are adjustable 
variables in the simulation model within a range of [0, 
99], initialized at 77 and 30 respectively.
Control Variable 3: Maximum resource height . 
Maximum resource height is set to control the maximum 
height of grass on the patches to prevent unlimited growth 
of grass.
Control Variable 4: Cooperative probability. Ranged 
in [0, 1.0], cooperative probability controls the percentage 
of cooperative turtles created in the initialization process 
with an initial value of 0.5.
Supervisor Related Parameters:
Control Variable 5: Population of supervisor. This 
represents the number of supervisors in the system. 
Population of supervisor remains constant for the reason 
that supervisors don’t die. Population of supervisors is 
within a range of [0, 100] with an initial value of 20.
Control Variable 6: Supervisors-stride-length. This is 
the stride-length for supervisors. Different supervisors-
stride-length implies different law enforcement strength 
in the system. The range is [0, 0.3] and the default value 
is 0.05, which is the same for the non-supervisor-turtles’ 
setting.
Control Variable 7: Punishment. Punishment defines 
how much energy a non-cooperator is deprived every time 
it is punished by a supervisor. The range is [0, 100] and 
the default value is 25.
Control Variable 8: Reward. Reward defines how 
much energy a cooperator will gain every time it is 
rewarded by a supervisor. The range is [0, 100] and the 
default value is 25.
3 .  M O D E L  M A N I P U L AT I O N  A N D 
DATA ANALYSIS OF COOPERATION 
BEHAVIOR NETLOGO SIMULATION 
MODEL
This paper aims to study the situational factors of 
cooperation behavior. According to (Weber, Kopelman 
& Messick, 2004), situational factors are identified as 
the task structure and perceptual factors. Task structure 
includes decision structure and social structure while 
perceptual factors include causes and frames. Decision 
structure is influenced by stride-length, metabolism etc. 
while social structure is influenced by supervisor related 
parameters mentioned above. To emphasize the focus 
of this paper, stride-length, population of supervisor, 
supervisors-stride-length, punishment and reward are 
selected as the situational factors to study in the model. 
The following section will manipulate different variables 
to discuss the variables’ influence on cooperation 
behaviors. 
Firstly, for stride-length, it is pointed out by (Di & 
Yan, 2011) that when stride-length lies between [0, 0.04], 
cooperators live and non-cooperators extinct after a 
period of time. When stride-length is 0.05, the situation 
reverses as cooperators extinct and non-cooperators live. 
Assuming that reward and punishment are equal and all 
other parameters default, the robust state of the system 
is analyzed after adding the supervisors. Here, this paper 
uses the robust state of the system at time of 100,000 as 
the observed results of experiments because time 100,000 
implies 100,000 turns of agent interactions which are 
sufficient simulation time for a-20-intial-agent simulation 
model. In this paper, after adding the supervisors, when 
supervisor-related parameters are default and stride-
length lies between [0, 0.04], cooperators survive and 
non-cooperators extinct. When stride-length is 0.05, both 
cooperators and non-cooperators live. When stride-length 
lies between [0.06, 0.30], cooperators extinct and non-
cooperators survive.
The data analysis above suggests that lower stride-
length is favorable for cooperators and unfavorable 
for non-cooperators. Reversely, higher stride-length 
can promote the population of non-cooperator and 
decrease the population of cooperator. This phenomenon 
implies that when mobility of individuals in the 
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system is restricted, cooperation behavior is good for 
survival. It can be interpreted as locality is the reason 
for cooperation. When locality increases and mobility 
decrease, resources available for each individual are 
actually reduced. As far as each type of each type of 
turtle is concerned, a cooperative turtle “treasures” the 
limited grass in its neighborhood and its cooperation 
behavior pays off because the limitation of resources. 
A non-cooperative turtle raids around its neighborhood 
and its non-cooperative behavior is punished because the 
grass available for it to raid is not enough. In our society, 
the phenomenon of locality promoting cooperation is 
frequently seen in rural areas in China. Due to the fact that 
traffic in such rural areas is under-developed, mobility of 
residents is limited. Non-cooperation behavior then has 
great behavioral costs as it damages public resources and 
harms common interests (Zhai, 2001). On the other hand, 
adding supervisors in the system broadened cooperators’ 
survival space of 0.01 to 0.05 stride-lengths under initial 
parameter settings. This phenomenon not only implies 
that supervisors are favorable for cooperators, but also 
implies that a robust state of the system where both 
cooperators and non-cooperators can live is achievable 
by adding to supervisors. The potential expansion of 
survival space for cooperators will be discussed in the 
final section of this chapter.
Population of supervisor promotes the population of 
cooperator and demotes the population of non-cooperator. 
If we set stride-length to be 0.05 and other parameters 
default when population of supervisor lies between [0, 
15], cooperators extinct after a period of time ((Figure 
1). Keeping other parameters the same, when population 
of supervisor lies between [16, 98], cooperators start to 
survive and gradually outnumber non-cooperators (Figure 
2, 3). When population of supervisor lies between [99, 
100], cooperators dominate and non-cooperators cannot 
survive eventually. Related charts are shown in Figure 1, 
Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4.
Figure 1
P o p u l a t i o n  o f  C o o p e r a t o r s  a n d  N o n -
Cooperators Over Time
(Population of Supervisor = 15, t = 100,000)
Figure 2
Population of Cooperators and Non-Cooperators Over 
Time
(Population of Supervisor = 16, t = 100,000)
Figure 3
Population of Cooperators and Non-Cooperators 
Over Time
(Population of Supervisor = 50, t = 100,000)
Figure 4
Population of Cooperators and Non-Cooperators Over 
Time
(Population of Supervisor = 99, t = 50,000)
Similarly, when supervisor-stride-length increases, 
population of cooperator increases and population of non-
cooperator drop. Keeping the population of supervisor 
at default value (20) and other parameters controlled, 
when supervisor-stride-length lies between [0, 0.03], 
cooperators extinct after a period of time and non-
cooperators dominates (Figure 5). When supervisor-
stride-length lies between [0.04, 0.3], cooperators survive 
and begin to gradually outnumber non-cooperators, but 
non-cooperators still survive (Figures 6, 7). Compared to 
population of supervisor, non-cooperators don’t extinct 
even when supervisor-stride-length achieves its maximum 
value. From this phenomenon we can see that “Barrel 
Effect” exists among supervisor-related parameters 
and survival of non-cooperators is not as sensitive to 
supervisor-stride-length as to population of supervisor. 
In fact, the world size of NetLogo simulation model 
is limited. Consequently, when supervisors’ mobility 
increases to a certain extent, marginal income of it 
decreases.
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Figure 5
Population of Cooperators and Non-Cooperators 
Over Time
(Supervisor-Stride-Length =0.03, t = 100,000)
Figure 6
Population of Cooperators and Non-Cooperators 
Over Time
(Supervisor-Stride-Length =0.04, t = 100,000)
Figure 7
Population of Cooperators and Non-Cooperators 
Over Time
(Supervisor-Stride-Length =0.3 , t = 100,000)
Figure 8
Population of Cooperators and Non-Cooperators 
Over Time
(Reward And Punishment = 17, t = 100,000)
Reward and punishment promote the population of 
cooperator and demote the population of non-cooperator. 
If we keep other parameters controlled and adjust reward 
and punishment, it is discovered that when reward and 
punishment lie between [0, 17], cooperators extinct and 
non-cooperators dominate (Figure 8). When reward 
and punishment lie between [18, 24], the results are the 
survival of both cooperators and non-cooperators but 
cooperators are outnumbered (Figure 9). When reward 
and punishment lie between [25, 100], both cooperators 
and non-cooperators survive eventually (Figure 11). As we 
can see, maximized reward and punishment do not result 
in the extinction of non-cooperators. This is because when 
population and mobility of supervisors are limited, general 
punishing effects on non-cooperators with maximizing 
reward and punishment cannot bring devastating damage 
to the whole non-cooperators crowd. As reward and 
punishment increase, marginal effect decreases.
Figure 9
Population of Cooperators and Non-Cooperators 
Over Time
(Reward and Punishment =18, t = 100,000)
Figure 10
Population of Cooperators and Non-Cooperators Over 
Time
(Reward and Punishment = 100, t = 100,000)
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Population of supervisor and supervisor-stride-
length jointly determine the density of law enforcement 
while reward and punishment determine the intensity 
of law enforcement. Generally, supervisors are not 
favorable for non-cooperators because they transfer non-
cooperators’ energy to cooperators. Therefore, when 
population of supervisor, supervisor-stride-length, reward 
and punishment increase, survival difficulty for non-
cooperators is raised and survival space for cooperators 
is enlarged. It was stated by (Di & Yan, 2011) that when 
stride-length is larger than 0.05, cooperators extinct 
and non-cooperators survive in all the robust state of 
the system. Cooperators are in a significantly weak 
competitive position against non-cooperators. However, 
after adding in supervisors, this paper discovers that when 
population of supervisor is 80, supervisor-stride-length is 
0.24, reward and punishment is 80, cooperators and non-
cooperators can both survive in an environment of 0.30 
stride-lengths, which is the maximum value of stride-
length (Figure 11). The competitive situation between 
cooperators and non-cooperators is more balanced with 
supervisors. As is analyzed in the previous section, stride-
length is an unfavorable parameter for cooperators. 
Therefore, survival of cooperators under dramatically 
increased stride-length implies an expansion of survival 
space in the dimension of stride-length for cooperators. 
In other words, the range of a dimension to reach a robust 
state where both types of turtles can live is widened. 
In conclusion, the joining of supervisors is capable of 
increasing the robustness of the system. 
Figure 11
Overview of Model
(Population of Supervisor = 80, Supervisor-Stride-Length = 0.24, Reward and Punishment = 80, t = 100,075)
C O N C L U S I O N  A N D  R E S E A R C H 
PROSPECT 
Adding supervisors enable resource re-allocation in the 
system and make the simulation model closer to real-
world social systems. Robustness of the system is also 
proven enhanced. In the work of (Di & Yan, 2011), non-
cooperators are in a dominant position while survival 
space for cooperators is rather compressed. In the example 
of stride-length, the range of stride-length to reach a 
robust state of the system where both cooperators and 
non-cooperators can survive is widened by 0.25 units. In 
other words, survival space for cooperators is enlarged 
by 0.25 in the dimension of stride-length. Besides, at the 
inflexion of Di and Yan’s work, where stride-length is 
0.05, this paper analyzes how the robust state shifts when 
density and intensity of law enforcement of supervisors 
change.
This paper proposed a third party role in the 
cooperation behavior simulation model to perform 
resource re-allocation. Related data analysis is performed 
in the examples of stride-length and supervisor-related 
parameters. For other parameters such as metabolism, 
reproduction-relat and patch-related variables, there is 
still research gap to fill. Further research can be based 
on above aspects to explore more properties of this 
cooperation system.
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